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INTRODUCTION

Let me, first of all, express the appreciation of all the speakers
for the hospitality shown to us here. As soon as we arrived at the
Nashville airport we realized that, whatever has happened to
courtesy in the rest of the country, we were now in a different
world. Here, "please" and "thank you" are still a part of the ordinary vocabulary.
As the keynote speaker of this symposium, it is my function to
provide a general framework within which the other speakers can
develop their specific topics with much more extensive and current knowledge than I have.
In a crude way, the importance of the subject matter can be
*Eli Goldston Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. LL.B. magna cum
laude 1951, Harvard Law School; A.B. summa cum laude 1948, Harvard College.
Associate Reporter Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Co-author,
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measured by the increase in the number of cases listed under the
West key numbers for "Judgments" which purport to collect all
of the cases on the enforcement of foreign judgments in United
States courts. The West Modern Federal Practice Digest uses
four pages under this caption to list cases for the years from 1939
to 1970. In contrast, the Federal Practice Digest 2d uses seven
and three-quarters pages for cases from 1967 to 1977 and the
pocket part has another three and one-half pages.1 Such statistics
hide the great disparities in the size and significance of international litigation. At one end of the scale is the mass of litigation
triggered by Nigeria's refusal to accept all the cement it had ordered, or the huge uranium contract and antitrust litigation in
the United States.2 At the other end is the case of a New York
couple who arranged to send furniture to New York from Vienna
and subsequently changed their mind, leaving the antique furniture dealer to resort to the Austrian long-arm rules.3
Involvement with foreign litigation tends to fall quite randomly
among trial lawyers; although some of them, like our speakers,
have substantial sophistication on foreign issues, many do not. A
trial lawyer's special skill is a sensitivity to the reactions of the
judges and juries they must persuade. This sensitivity can be a
very localized aptitude. The great trial lawyers, from Clarence
Darrow on, are not seen as cosmopolitan persons.
By the same token, many judges have only a vague understanding of what occurs in foreign courts. Some glimpses of judicial
views in other nations' courts often offer pictures not only of the
issues, but also of the writers. One view is that of Lord Denning
of the United Kingdom Court of Appeal:
As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the
United States. If he can only get his case into their courts, he
stands to win a fortune. At no cost to himself; and at no risk of
having to pay anything to the other side. The lawyers there will
conduct the case "on spec" as we say, or on a "contingency fee" as
they say. The lawyers will charge the litigant nothing for their ser1. 33A FED. PRAC. DIG. 235-39 (1970); 51 WEST's FED. PRAC. DIG. 2D 1156-63

(1977); id. at 391-94 (Supp. 1982). The original version took eight pages to cover
the years 1754 to 1941. 42 FED. DIG. 939-47 (1941).
2. One of the leading cases in this series is Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of
Nigeria, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). See also Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Fed-

eral Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
3.

Siedler v. Jacobson, 86 Misc. 2d 1010, 383 N.Y.S.2d 833 (App. Term 1976).
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vices but instead they will take 40 percent of the damages, if they
win the case in court, or out of court on a settlement. If they lose,
the litigant will have nothing to pay to the other side. The courts
in the United States have no such costs deterrent as we have.
There is also in the United States a right to trial by jury. These are
prone to award fabulous damages. They are notoriously sympathetic and know that the lawyers will take their 40 percent before
the plaintiff gets anything. All this means that the defendant can
be readily forced into a settlement. The plaintiff holds all the
cards.'
On the whole, the attitude of United States courts towards British courts is almost deferential. This attitude is occasionally expressed in ways that must seem curious to foreign courts. For example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "United
States courts . . . are hardly in a position to call the Queen's

Bench a kangaroo court."5 My Australian friends find this analogy puzzling. On the other hand, harsh words often have been
spoken of less familiar judicial systems. Witness District Judge
Mansfield's description of East German courts:
Such consideration reveals the decisions of the Supreme Court of
East Germany to be so completely lacking in any objectivity of approach and so thoroughly saturated with a combination of communist propaganda, diatribes against the "capitalist oriented" decisions of the West German courts, and absence of judicial restraint,
that any logical analysis is obfuscated by their obvious political
mission. .. .West German court decisions are described in the following terms: inspired and controlled by "monopolistic-capitalistic
circles"; "nothing to do with juridical reasoning but amounts to an
irresponsible juggling with fictitious notions"; "formalistic bourgeois methods [which] make it impossible to veil such coarse violations of law"; "pretense of strict lawfulness"; "conscious falsification"; and "contradictions between [a] peacefully minded
population and a warlike revenge-inspired State, which find their
expression chiefly in the clerico-militaristic federation at Bonn."
4. Smith Kline & French Laboratories v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733-34
(C.A. 1982). For a United States response that criticizes domestic lawyers for

encouraging such a view of United States law, see Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan
American World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124, 1133 (D.D.C. 1983). For a British
rejoinder showing more understanding of national differences in procedure, see
British Airways v. Laker Airways, [1983] W.L.R. 545, 575 (C.A.).
5. British Midland Airways, Ltd. v. International Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869,
871 (9th Cir. 1974); see also Colonial Bank v. Worms, 550 F. Supp. 55, 58
(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
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In contrast to those of East Germany, the decisions of the courts of
West Germany appear to be restrained, objective, reasonably logical, and dispassionate in their approach.'
Another example from an earlier time is the Texas Supreme
Court's view of Mexican procedures.
The proceedings shown in relation to this judgment make it manifest that the trial of the case in the Mexican court was wanting in
these essential elements. They reveal that the action was one unquestionably resting in questions of fact, and that Masterson
pleaded what would have constituted a good defense, yet that he
was denied the right to present it, it not appearing that his offer to
support it was unseasonably made. If it be urged that this was warranted by the Mexican procedure, we are unwilling to give conclusiveness to a judgment which such a procedure sanctions. The
judgment and the recitals which accompany it are a maze of words;
but as we interpret their vague and confused statements, it appears
to have been rendered upon no proof whatever. It furthermore appears that Masterson was denied an appeal from the judgment
upon what seems to us to have been a frivolous ground, namely,
the omission to affix a stamp to the document of appeal. The entire
proceeding appears to have been arbitrary in its nature and sumin our opinion, properly demary in its execution; and the court,
7
clined to give the judgment effect.

In collecting such views, one is mindful of the warning contained in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Zschernig.8 He
noted that making judgments about procedures in foreign courts,
as required under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Money
Judgments Act, might pose as many difficulties as those produced
when state courts must first determine if foreign laws allow heirs
to enjoy United States inheritances before granting an alien the
right to inherit. Litigating lawyers also must make judgments
about the qualities of unfamiliar foreign courts.

6. Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. Carl Zeiss, Jena, 293 F. Supp. 892, 907-08
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd as modified, 433 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1970).

7. Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 537, 172 S.W. 711, 715 (1915). But
see Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-05 (1895) (approving French procedures
although different from the United States model).
8. Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 461-62 (1968).
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II.

THE FRAMEWORK

A. Preliminary Planning
An international lawsuit can be broken down into stages, each
representing a branch in the tree of successive decisionmaking.
The emergence of a sense of grievance in the plaintiff's mind
starts the first stage. He has been hurt and wants to sue somebody. That attitude leads to a consultation with a lawyer, presumably in the plaintiff's vicinage. The lawyer should recognize
any foreign element in the case which could mean that the lawsuit should be tried before a foreign court. Taking the case to a
foreign court would involve the transport of United States input-legal rules, testimony, documents-abroad. Conversely, the
case might well be better tried in the United States, at least from
the plaintiff's point of view. This location for the case would require the introduction of foreign elements in the United States.
Making this forum decision necessitates the understanding of
some elements of foreign law, both substantive and procedural.
To acquire this knowledge, United States attorneys must consult
foreign counsel because it would be foolish to try to make decisions in these fields without training or practice. Finding the desired type of foreign counsel is not easy. Most lawyers in the
United States do not have a network of acquaintances extending
beyond this country. The labels that describe foreign lawyers add
to the confusion; one encounters the terms avou6s, avocats, and
notaires which are each equivalent to "lawyer." ' Their functions,
however, differ from United States categories. For example, in
Great Britain, as well as in other countries, the trial bar is separate from the counseling bar. This division raises an initial question: Can a British barrister be consulted directly, or must a British solicitor be the intermediary?10 Firms with regular
connections abroad have a definite edge in selecting and making
contact with foreign lawyers.
Once a foreign lawyer is chosen, communications seem to fall
9. See 1-2 TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE (D. Campbell ed. 1982) (collects a
vast quantity of information about lawyers in foreign countries).
10. Costello, England and Wales in 1 id. at 95: ("a barrister is permitted
only to give advice to a foreign lawyer directly without the intervention of a
solicitor in the case of noncontentious matters in which no litigation (or arbitration) in England is contemplated or in progress"); see also In re T. (A Barrister), [1981] 3 W.L.R. 653, 658 (Visitors to Lincoln's Inn).

6
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within the United States-version of the attorney-client privilege,
even with an interpreter.1 1 A recent case1 2 from the Court of Justice of the European Communities, however, indicates that only
those engaged as independent practitioners within the Community are entitled to the privilege.
At some early stage, the question of fees raises its disturbing
head. Counsel outside the United States are, like Lord Denning, 13
apt to see United States litigation costs as extraordinary. Although legal costs are likely to be lower abroad, they can be surprising. Thus, the application of foreign courts' rules that award a
percentage of the amount in controversy (the German Streitwert)
can produce strange results when a foreign lawyer plays a very
small role in a very large case. 4
B.

Choosing a Forum

Counsel must recommend whether to bring a suit and where it
should be brought. The latter decision can be a complex one.
First, the question of in personam jurisdiction must be considered. The bases for jurisdiction in the United States (from doing
business, to mere presence, to long-arm statutes) vary from those
recognized in Europe. 15 Each system has some type of jurisdictional claim that others regard as "exorbitant." France allows suit
by virtue of a plaintiff's nationality. Germany sustains a suit if
some of the defendant's property is present; in one case, a skier's
underwear provided the necessary property. Other nations may
find it strange that jurisdiction can arise under United States law
merely because the sheriff was able to catch the defendant in
transit within United States borders.1 " Later in the litigation, it is
important to determine whether the jurisdictional basis of the
judgment will be recognized and enforced in foreign courts.
Choice of law rules are supposed to minimize forum shopping, but

11. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2300, 2317 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
12. A. M. & S. Europe, Ltd. v. Commission of the Eur. Community, [1982] E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575 (case 155/79).
13. See Smith Kline & French Laboratories, [1983] 1 W.L.R. at 733-34.
14. See generally R. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 342-52 (4th ed. 1980).

15. Materials on different nations' views on the appropriate jurisdictional basis appear in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, ch. 7, at
729-58 (2d ed. 1976).
16. Some American judges would agree. E.g., Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91,

34 A. 714 (1895).
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instead, they leave many differences between fora. Thus, no conflicts of law principles affect the likelihood that a New York jury
will award more liberal damages than a London judge.1 7 In regulatory areas such as antitrust, courts will decide whether their
own state's statute applies under the rubric of legislative or regulatory jurisdiction, and not which antitrust law should be applied
according to choice of law rules.
The choice of forum decision may be complicated by the more
or less simultaneous selection of a different forum by the other
party. Injunctions, restraining orders, and harsh words between
judges as well as parties may ensue.1 ' The selection of forum may
have been predetermined by a choice of forum clause or, more
likely, by an arbitration clause. Even so, a struggle may remain if
it can be asserted that the matter is not arbitrable because of the
involved state's public policy. Whether or not to make a challenge
or to take a delaying or disruptive stance in the arbitration depends on many factual elements. If the potential foreign defendant is a sovereign state or an instrumentality of a state, a different set of rules and constraints become relevant.
C. Litigating the Case
Once a forum is chosen, proceedings must be initiated for the
plaintiff in the optimum way. The complaint or its foreign
equivalent must meet local standards. The generalized "notice"
pleading, accepted in the United States, will cause problems in
foreign jurisdictions that expect a much more detailed description
of the plaintiff's theories and supporting facts.1 9 Service should be
effected upon defendants in a manner that not only will satisfy
the forum's requirements, but also will facilitate the recognition
of the resulting judgment in other jurisdictions. This may involve
complying with the Hague Convention on Service of Process.20
17. Cf. Smith Kline & French Laboratories, [1983] 1 W.L.R. at 733-34.
18. Baade, An Overview of Transnational Parallel Litigation: Recommended Strategies, 1 REv. LrrnG. 191 (1981).

19. For a comparison of German and United States pleading practices, see
Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, Phases of German Civil ProcedureI, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 1193, 1212-21 (1958).
20. Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No.
6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163. For commentary on the treaty, see RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTED STATES § 481 (Tent. Draft No. 5

1984).
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The next stage is discovery. Despite the progress that has been
made in improving cooperation between courts, notably in the adherence of many states to the Hague Convention on Evidence,
discovery problems do remain. 2 1 For example, even our British
cousins look askance upon the United States style of "fishing expeditions." 22 This nonacceptance makes the task of discovery
harder for plaintiffs who need to make their case from defendants' files. In other jurisdictions, no sharp division exists between discovery and the trial itself. The judge or judges retain
control over both parts of the process.
The trial itself will, of course, be very different. The randomly
chosen, ad hoc United States jury in civil litigation has disappeared from almost every other jurisdiction. Lay persons may appear, but only in the guise of co-judges who often sit for long
stretches and frequently are selected for their business expertise.
Styles of argument must be tempered to the nature of the judicial
approach in the foreign jurisdiction; quarrels about hearsay and
other exclusionary rules of evidence do not have a role when no
jury is to be protected from prejudice. European judges feel much
more responsible for dragging out the facts of the case than do
United States judges who rely on counsel to do the job via discovery. 23 Trials can be long and dilatory; indeed, they may be interrupted while the court personnel turn to other cases or while additional evidence is sought. One must recognize, however, that
this delay is much less a factor in many jurisdictions abroad than
in the more crowded districts of the United States.
D. Enforcing the Judgment
Finally, a judgment is rendered that may, of course, be appealed by stubborn litigants. As Lord Denning noted, foreign
judgments appear to be more modest in amount than United

21. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444. For commentary on
the treaty, see RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 483.
22. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., [1978] A.C. 547 (H.L.).

For a defense of United States practices, see Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 559 F. Supp. at 1132-33.

23. For comparisons of European and American civil procedure, see Kaplan,
Civil Procedure-Reflections on the Comparison of Systems, 9 BUFFALo REv.
409 (1960); Kaplan, von Mehren & Schaefer, supra note 19, at 1193.
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States judgments.24 If the judgment can be satisfied out of local
assets or by the acquiescence of the defendant, well and good. If
not, one may have to seek enforcement of the judgment abroad.
United States judgments are particularly dependent upon the
comity or generosity of foreign legal systems because the United
States is not a party to any treaties dealing with the enforcement
of judgments abroad.2 5 A United States judgment has a good
chance of being denied recognition upon grounds of public policy
or failure to prove reciprocity. Reciprocity is sometimes a difficult
matter because we are a fifty state jurisdiction.2" There is even a
risk that a United States antitrust judgment will not only be refused enforcement, but also will be "clawed back," meaning a foreign defendant will be able to recover the penal portion of the
United States award.2 7 Enforcement of a foreign judgment in the
United States is also a somewhat venturesome proposition. Although enforcement is the usual result in routine cases, the parameters of the penal and public policy exceptions are still in
doubt. The presence of the Uniform Recognition of Foreign
Money Judgments Act in some states narrows the range of possible disputes, but does not eliminate them.

24. See Smith Kline & French Laboratories, [1983] 1 W.L.R. at 733-34.
25. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, §§ 491-98 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983) (notes
the failure to achieve agreement with Great Britain). The United States defendant should be aware that, under a 1968 convention, judgments of one court in
the European Community can be enforced elsewhere in the Community. Id. at
115-16.
26. Cf. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 491, at 110-11, 115 (Tent. Draft No. 4,

1983).
27. Compare Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction:The British Pro-

tection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, 75 Am. J. INT'L. L. 257 (1981), with
Lowenfeld, Sovereignty, Jurisdiction and Reasonableness: A Reply to A. V.

Lowe, id. at 629.

